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Casenote

Who's on First?: Why Philip Morris USA v.
Williams Left Juries Confused About Whose
Injuries Can Be Considered When
Determining Punitive Damages

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the third time in eleven years, the United States Supreme Court
imposed constitutional limits on punitive damage awards. In Philip
Morris USA v. Williams,' the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that punitive
damages cannot be used to punish a defendant for injuries that the
defendant infficted upon nonparties to the case. 2 However, the Court
also held that injuries to nonparties can be considered when determining
the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct under the "Gore
guideposts."3 Nevertheless, this decision is important for trial lawyers
for what the Court did not hold. Once again, the Court passed on the

1. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
2. Id. at 1063.
3. Id. at 1063-64. The Court created the Gore guideposts in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996). These guideposts are discussed in detail in
Section III of this Casenote. See infra text accompanying notes 73-93.
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opportunity to decide how much was too much when determining the
size of punitive damage awards.4
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Throughout his entire life, Jesse Williams heavily smoked Philip
Morris USA brand cigarettes, of which Marlboros were his favorite.
After Jesse died in 1997 from a form of lung cancer traditionally caused
by cigarette smoking, Jesse's widow filed a lawsuit on behalf of his
estate against Philip Morris for negligence and deceit.5 At trial a jury
found for the plaintiff on both claims. The jury concluded that Jesse's
cancer was caused by smoking Philip Morris cigarettes and that Jesse
primarily smoked these cigarettes because he relied on the company's
deceitful and negligent claims that smoking was safe.6 Jesse's false
belief regarding the safety of smoking was influenced by a public
relations campaign that Philip Morris and other tobacco companies
implemented to create the public perception that scientists genuinely
disagreed about smoking's carcinogenic effects. To create this misconception, the cigarette companies performed joint scientific studies that
avoided researching the biological effects of smoking cigarettes.7
Additionally, although Philip Morris knew that correlations existed
between smoking and cancer, throughout the 1950s and 1960s Philip
Morris proclaimed that it "would 'stop business tomorrow' if it believed
that its products were harmful."8 In an internal memo, a Philip Morris
corporate officer stated that the goal of these studies and statements
"was to give smokers a psychological crutch" to encourage them to
continue smoking.9
At trial, the estate's attorney asked the jury, when determining
punitive damages, to consider not only how Philip Morris's misleading
statements harmed Jesse, but also how many other Oregonians were
misled and harmed by Philip Morris's statements and studies. ° In
response, Philip Morris proposed a jury instruction that punitive
damages could be used to punish Philip Morris only for its misconduct
toward Jesse and not for its misconduct toward other Oregon residents

4.
5.
Morris
6.
7.
2004).

Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007); Williams v. Philip
Inc. ("Williams 1"), 48 P.3d 824, 829 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. ("Williams Iff'), 92 P.3d 126, 128-29 (Or. Ct. App.

8. Id. at 129.
9. Id.
10. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
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who were not parties to the case. The trial judge rejected this instruction, and the jury found for the estate, awarding $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages.11 However, the
trial judge ruled that the award was excessive and violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; 2 therefore, the judge reduced the punitive damages
award to $32 million. 3
On appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, Philip Morris argued that
the trial judge's rejection of its jury instruction and the size of the
punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause. 4 The court
of appeals rejected the first argument and cited Parrott v. Carr
Chevrolet, Inc.15 In Parrottthe Oregon Supreme Court held that juries,
when determining the amount of punitive damages, can consider the
potential injuries that the defendant caused to past, present, and future
consumers who are not parties to the case. 6 The court of appeals also
rejected the second argument regarding the size of the award, holding
that "'no simple mathematical formula controls our review of the ratio
of punitive damages'" and that the 97-1 ratio was not excessive under
the Due Process Clause." The court of appeals then reinstated the
original $79.5 million punitive damages award against Philip Morris. s
After the Oregon Supreme Court declined to review the case, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, without oral
arguments, remanded the case back to the Oregon Court of Appeals for
reconsideration in light of the decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell.19 On remand, the court of appeals readopted its original decision and held that Philip Morris could be
punished for its conduct towards nonparties because there was evidence
that other Oregon residents were harmed and misled by the same public

11. Id. Punitive damages were only awarded on the fraud claim. Because the jury
found Jesse to be fifty percent negligent for his own death, the jury declined to award
punitive damages on the negligence claim. Williams 1, 48 P.3d at 828.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
14. Williams I, 48 P.3d at 837.
15. 17 P.3d 473 (Or. 2001).
16. Williams 1, 48 P.3d at 837 (citing Parrott,17 P.3d at 489).
17. Id. at 840-41 (quoting Parrott,17 P.3d at 489).
18. Id. at 843. The Oregon Court of Appeals granted Philip Morris's petition for
reconsideration of Williams I to consider questions not relevant to the issue of punitive
damages. However, the court of appeals adhered to its original decision. See generally
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. ("Williams II), 51 P.3d 670 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
19. 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. In Campbell the Court
reexamined each of the three Gore guideposts in detail. 538 U.S. at 419-28. This case is
further discussed in Section III of this Casenote. See infra text accompanying notes 96-107.
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relations campaign that misled Jesse.20 When considering the size of
the punitive damages award, the court of appeals recognized there is a
presumption of constitutional invalidity.2 1 However, using the Gore
guideposts as applied in Campbell, the court of appeals concluded that
Philip Morris's conduct endangered the health of the Oregon public and
that this conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant the $79.5 million
in punitive damages.22 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals.2" On appeal for a second time, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that punishing
a defendant with punitive damages for harming nonparties to the case
violated the defendant's due process rights.24
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Early History of Punitive Damages
Since its inception, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to
determine whether there should be limitations on the size of punitive
damage awards and, if so, how courts should regulate this area of law
that is traditionally controlled by the jury. Punitive damages first
appeared in the common law more than two centuries ago.25 Huckle v.
Money2 6 is commonly cited as the first recorded case to recognize the
existence of punitive damages in the English common law.27 In Huckle
the English court held that juries, when awarding tort damages, could
consider the "state, degree, quality, trade or profession of the party
injured, as well as of the person who did the injury."25 In Wilkes v.
Wood,29 the English court added that juries could punish the guilty and
deter similar conduct by awarding damages in excess of the plaintiff's
actual harm.30 American courts quickly absorbed this doctrine, which
made one of its earliest reported appearances in South Carolina in
1784. 3' In Genay v. Norris,32 a plaintiff was awarded punitive damag-

20. Williams III, 92 P.3d at 127-28, 141-42.
21. Id. at 144.
22. Id. at 145.
23.
24.
25.
1257,
26.
27.
28.
29.

See generally Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165 (Or. 2006).
Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1060.
David Owen, Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1263 n.19 (1976).
(1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (KB.).
Owen, supra note 25, at 1263 n.19.
95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB.).

30. Id. at 498-99.
31.

Owen, supra note 25, at 1263 n.20.
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es after the defendant slipped a poison into the plaintiff's wine, causing
the plaintiff to become ill.33
Under the common law system, juries were given full discretion to
award punitive damages and to determine the amount of damages to be
assessed upon the defendant. 34
American courts treat punitive
damages as a form of "private fines" that serve as retribution and
deterrence for a defendant's wrongdoing.35 However, unlike criminal
fines, punitive damages are given to the injured rather than to the
state.3" Scholars have also claimed that punitive damage awards allow
society to express its "social outrage" at the defendant's reprehensible
conduct.37 The United States Suprerme Court reaffirmed many of these
common law principles in Day v. Woodworth"5 by giving juries unbridled discretion to decide when and how much punitive damages should
be awarded.3 9
On July 28, 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the
United States Constitution. 40 Thus, in addition to adhering to the
common law traditions, punitive damages now had to satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. 41 However, the Supreme
Court continued to give juries the same deference they possessed before
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, in Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes,4 2 the Court held that no definite rules
control the jury's discretion. 43 The Court later held, in Minneapolis &
Saint Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith," that the application of punitive
damages does not violate the Due Process Clause because punitive
damages45 have been recognized as proper and legal for more than a
century.

32. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).
33. Id.
34. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
35. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974)); see also Day, 54 U.S. at 371.
36. Day, 54 U.S. at 371.
37. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing PunitiveDamages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2075 (1998).
38. 54 U.S. 363 (1851).
39. Id. at 371.
40. 15 Stat. 708, 711 (1868).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XJV, § 1.
42. 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
43. Id. at 521.
44. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
45. Id. at 36; see also Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) ("[N]othing is better
settled than . . . the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their
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B. The Court Hints at Due ProcessProtections and Begins to Rein in
the Jury's Authority
As the United States Supreme Court entered the Lochner era,46 the
justices began hinting that the Due Process Clause has substantive
limits "beyond which penalties may not go." 47 The cases from this
period primarily focused on the application of statutory as opposed to
common law punitive damages. 41 In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,49
the Court held that by imposing penalties that were "grossly excessive,"
a state was depriving defendants of their property without due process
of law.50 In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Tucker,5 ' the Court set
aside a $500 penalty, which was to be paid to the plaintiff, and
concluded that the penalty was unreasonable and "repugnant to the due
process ...

clause[] of the 14th Amendment." 2

While many of the

precedents from the Lochner era were discredited, the Court treats the
punitive damages cases differently because the dissenting justices in
Lochner joined in the majorities of the punitive damages cases.53
After limiting the size of statutory punitive damages, the Supreme
Court began entertaining the idea that the Due Process Clause might
also limit the jury's unbridled authority to administer common law
punitive damages. For instance, the Court in Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Lavoie,s4 referred to the appellant's Due Process argument as
"rais[ing] important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be
verdict."); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 U.S. at 521 ("[Tlhe wisdom of allowing such additional
damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the practice.").
46. The Lochner era, which is named for the case Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), refers to a period in the Supreme Court's history that lasted from 1897 until 1937.
During this era, the Court held that laws regulating an employee's working hours, wages,
and conditions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1469 (2005). Today, many of the precedents from this era are discredited, and
Lochner is considered one of the most reviled cases in American history. Id.
47. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907).
48. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919)
(authorizing passengers who were overcharged by railways to collect between $50 and $300
in penalties in a civil action); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 100 (1909)
(awarding plaintiffs "not less than $200 nor more than $5,000" for each day that the
defendant violated the state's antitrust law); Seaboard Air Line Ry., 207 U.S. at 75-76
(awarding $50 per day to the aggravated party if the carrier failed to follow the statute).
49. 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
50. Id. at 111.
51. 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
52. Id. at 346-47.
53. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 455 (1993).
54. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
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resolved."5 The Court, however, did not reach the issue of whether
excessive punitive damages violated the Due Process Clause. The Court
also refused to create due process limitations in Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw.56 However, Justice O'Connor, when referring to the
jury's discretion to award common law punitive damages, stated in her
concurrence that "[tihis grant of wholly standardless discretion to
determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due
process." 7 A year later in Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,58 the Court concluded that "we have never
addressed ... whether due process acts as a check on undue jury
discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any express
statutory limit. That inquiry must await another day."" In light of
the Lochner era cases that limited the size of statutory punitive
damages, the Court unanimously agreed that the issue of due process
60
limitations on common law punitive damages should be addressed.
After dodging the issue in several cases, the Supreme Court could not
avoid addressing the due process argument in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.6 1 In Haslip the Court held that the common
law procedure of giving juries unbridled discretion may "invite extreme
results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." 2 The Court then
placed a check on the jury's discretion by endorsing the Alabama
Supreme Court's posttrial procedures for reviewing a jury's punitive
damages award. 3 During the posttrial procedures, Alabama courts
considered several factors when determining if a jury's punitive damages
award bore a reasonable relationship to the defendant's present and
future harm.' 4 Aside from discussing the procedures, the United States

55. Id. at 828-29.

56. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
57. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

58. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
59. Id. at 276-77 (citations omitted).
60. See id.; id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion on the
understanding that it leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause
constrains the imposition of punitive damages.. . ."); id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[Nlothing in the Court's opinion forecloses a due process
challenge to awards of punitive damages...
61. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).

62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id. at 21-22. The Alabama Supreme Court held that a jury could consider, among
other things: (1) the relationship between the punitive damages and the harm that the
defendant caused and will cause; (2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct; (3) the defendant's profits during the wrongful act; (4) the current financial
position of the defendant; (5) the cost of the litigation; and (6) the criminal and civil
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Supreme Court declined to draw a mathematical bright-line ratio to
determine when a punitive damages award was excessive under the Due
Process Clause.65 However, the Court held that a 4-1 ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages "may be close to the line."6' The refusal to
establish a bright-line ratio was affirmed two years later in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.6" There, the Court
affirmed a punitive damages judgment with a 526-1 ratio.6
The procedures used to limit the jury's unfettered discretion were
further developed in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.69 In Oberg the
Supreme Court held that a punitive damages award violated the Due
Process Clause because Oregon law did not provide for judicial review
of the size of punitive damages awards."0 The Court determined that
judicial review was one of the few procedural safeguards from excessive
punitive damages.7 1 While the Court did not decide whether the
punitive damages award was excessive, Oberg marked the first time that
the Court set aside a jury's common law punitive damages award on due
process grounds.72
C. How Much is too Much?
The United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore73 finally provided some guidance on how to determine when a
punitive damages award was excessive, and for the first time, the Court
struck down a common law punitive damages award as being excessive. 74 The plaintiff in Gore purchased an imported car from the
defendant in Alabama. After nine months, the plaintiff learned that the
car had been damaged during its transport across the Atlantic Ocean
and was repainted upon arriving in the United States.75 At the time
of the incident, BMW had a nationwide policy of selling cars without
notifying the buyers that the car was damaged during manufacturing or

punishments already inflicted against the defendant. Id. (citing Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. v.
Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 377 (Ala. 1989)).
65. Id. at 18.
66. Id. at 23.
67. 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
68. Id. at 453.
69. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
70. Id. at 432.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
74. Id. at 585-86.
75. Id. at 563 & n.1.
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transport.76 While BMW's policy violated Alabama law, it was consistent with the laws of twenty-five other states.77 As a result of the
policy, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently sold him a
car that had lost ten percent of its value because it had been repaint78
ed.
The Court addressed two issues in Gore. First, the Court held that
juries could not punish a national corporation for out-of-state conduct
that was legal in the state where the conduct occurred. 79 The Court
reasoned that the purpose of punitive damages was to support the state's
interest in protecting its consumers and its economy 0 That purpose
was not furthered by punishing a defendant for conduct that both
occurred outside of the state and did not affect the state or its citizens. 8' The Court also held that the principles of state sovereignty
prevented a state from using punitive damages to influence a defendant's conduct in another state. 2
In addressing the second issue, the Court created three guideposts to
aid lower courts in determining when a punitive damages award was
excessive. 3 This test ensured that the defendant would receive fair
notice that its conduct would be subjected to a severe punishment."
The first guidepost analyzed the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct.8M
This guidepost was the most important indication of
excessiveness and reflected the principle that some wrongs are worse
than others.8 6 In Gore this guidepost suggested awarding smaller
punitive damages because BMW's conduct caused purely economic harm
and did not place anyone in physical danger.8 7 The second guidepost
called for the courts to review the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages to ensure that the two awards bore a reasonable
M
relationship."
While the Court refused to set a bright-line rule, it
reaffirmed that the 4-1 ratio from Haslip was close to the line but also

76. Id. at 563-64.
77. Id. at 565.
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 572-73.
80. Id. at 572.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 571-72. After the jury awarded the punitive damages, BMW immediately
changed its nationwide policy to notify all potential buyers of all repairs, no matter how
minor. Id. at 565-66.
83. Id. at 574-75.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 575.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id. at 580.
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recognized that it had allowed a 526-1 ratio in TXO Production Corp. 9
The ratio in Gore was a "breathtaking 500 to 1.9 0 The third guidepost
asked the courts to compare the punitive damages award to similar
criminal or civil statutory penalties.9' Even though BMW could have
received a $2000 fine in a criminal proceeding, it was ordered to pay $2
million in common law punitive damages.9 2 Using the guideposts, the
Court was "fully convinced that the grossly excessive
award imposed in
93
this case transcend[ed] the constitutional limit."
After determining in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc.94 that the Gore guideposts were to be reviewed de novo,95
the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 96 sought to clarify the Gore guideposts. In Campbell the Court
again struck down a punitive damages award as being excessive under
the Due Process Clause. 97 The plaintiff in Campbell, who had caused
a car accident, alleged that his insurance company fraudulently told him
that it would pay any judgment if the plaintiff went to trial to defend
the claims from the accident victims. Relying on this advice, the
plaintiff went to trial and lost, and the insurance company refused to
pay the judgment.9" At the trial against the insurance company, the
plaintiff provided evidence that his encounter with the insurance
company was one of many frauds it had committed across the nation to
meet its corporate fiscal goals.99
Applying the first Gore guidepost (reprehensibility), the Court
expanded its ruling in Gore and held that a defendant cannot be
punished for any conduct that occurred outside the state's jurisdiction.10 ° The Court then added to this rule, holding that a jury may not
use punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuring nonparties
unless the injuries to the nonparties and the plaintiff were similar. 1'
This holding reflected the notion that the United States Constitution

89. Id. at 581.
90. Id. at 583.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 584.
93. Id. at 585-86.
94. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
95. Id. at 431.
96. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
97. Id. at 412.
98. Id. at 412-13.
99. Id. at 415.
100. Id. at 421 ("Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of
the State's jurisdiction.").
101. Id. at 422-23.
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does not allow courts to "adjudicate ... hypothetical claims against a
defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis."10 2 The
Court concluded that the defendant should not have been punished for
its out-of-state conduct and that the plaintiff's injuries were not similar
suffered by other victims of State Farm's nationwide
to the10injuries
3
policy.
Under the second Gore guidepost (ratio), the Court refused to endorse
a bright-line rule but concluded that the 145-1 ratio in Campbell raised
a presumption of constitutional invalidity. l " The Court held that "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
Using the third Gore
damages ... will satisfy due process."0 5
guidepost (existence of statutory penalties), the Court concluded that the
insurance company's $145 million judgment far exceeded the $10,000
fine it could have received. 0 6 Weighing all the guideposts, the Court
in Campbell held that the jury's punitive damages award was excessive. 0 7 Four years later, the Court in Philip Morris USA v. Williams0 8 attempted to refine the Court's application in Campbell of the
Gore guideposts.
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
A.

The Majority Opinion

Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Philip Morris USA v. Williams'0 9 resumed the discussion from State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell"' and BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore"'. by holding that the Due Process Clause" 2 monitors two
aspects of punitive damages awards."' First, the Court held the Due
Process Clause controls the jury's discretion by imposing limitations on
the procedures for awarding punitive damages." 4 Second, the Court

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 423.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 424-26.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
Id.
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held the Due Process Clause prohibits excessive punitive damages. 115
The Court started its analysis by discussing the procedures used by the
Oregon courts." 6 Summing up the cases from the last twenty years,
the Court held that the state had to "cabin the jury's discretionary
authority" or risk depriving a defendant of fair notice while administering arbitrary punishments and imposing one state's policies on its neighbors." 7 In this case, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
required that the Oregon trial court instruct the jury to not punish the
defendant for injuries it inflicted on nonparties to the litigation. 1 8
The Court provided two reasons for its holding. First, according to the
Court, the Due Process Clause allowed the defendant "'an opportunity
to present every available defense.'" '
If the jury, when determining
punitive damages, considered injuries of nonparties, the defendant could
not defend itself against the accusations of harm toward these hypothetical victims. 20 For example, when the plaintiff in Philip Morris USA
asked the jury to "think about how many other Jesse Williams[es]...
in the State of Oregon there have been,"'2 1 Philip Morris would have
been unable to prove that these other Jesse Williamses were not harmed
by Philip Morris's fraudulent statements. 22 Justice Breyer noted that
it was possible that these other Jesse Williamses already knew smoking
was dangerous and did not rely on Philip Morris's fraudulent statements
or studies.'23 Because Philip Morris could not defend against these
hypothetical claims, it could be subjected to punishment for deceiving
people it may not have deceived.' 2 4
Second, the Court held that allowing juries to punish defendants for
causing injuries to nonparties would create a "near standardless
dimension to the punitive damages equation."" When thinking about
the other Jesse Williamses, the jury would have to consider things such
as the similarity of the victims, the seriousness of each nonparty's
injuries, and the manner in which each nonparty was injured. 26 Since
these nonparties were not before the court, the jury would have been left

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Norment, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
Id.
Id. at 1061 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1063.
Id.
See id.

Id.
Id.
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to speculate. 27 This speculation, the Court concluded, would lead to
arbitrary punitive damages awards and lack of proper notice for
defendants. 2 ' The Court recognized that it had never explicitly held
that juries could not punish defendants for causing harm to nonparties. 129 0 However, as Justice Breyer proclaimed, "we do so hold
13
now."
Three paragraphs after the Court created this new rule, the Court
held that, when considering the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct under the Gore guideposts, juries can take into consideration
injuries to nonparties. 3 ' Thus, a jury must be instructed that it may
consider injuries to nonparties when determining the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, but the jury may not go further and consider
injuries to nonparties when determining the actual size of the punitive
damages award, even though reprehensibility is the most important
132
guidepost when determining the size of a punitive damages award.
When writing about this fine distinction of when juries can and cannot
consider nonparty injuries, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that
"[t]his nuance eludes me. " 13 3 He concluded that the majority's holding
was confusing because any time a jury determines the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct, "the jury is by definition punishing the
defendant-directly-for third-party harm." 134
Furthermore, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that this holding would make it "'unclear
... how a jury could consider harm to others, yet withhold that
consideration from the punishment calculus. ' 135 When addressing the
concerns of Justice Stevens and the Oregon Supreme Court, the majority
held that this was a "practical problem" and left it to the states to
provide "some form of protection" to prevent juries from being con3
fused. 1
Applying this holding to the facts, the Court held that the Oregon
courts "applied the wrong constitutional standard" by allowing the jury,

127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1065.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 1063-64.
132. Id. at 1064; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 ("Perhaps the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct.").
133. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1065 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 n.3 (Or. 2006)).
136. Id.
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when deciding the size of the punitive damages award, to consider the
harm to other Oregonians who were not parties to the case.'3 7 Thus,
the Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's ruling and remanded the
case. 3 ' While the Court vacated the judgment on procedural grounds,
it never addressed whether the punitive damages award, which had a
ratio of 100-1, was grossly excessive. The Court held it was unnecessary
to reach that question because the award was already set aside on
procedural grounds and a new trial or reduction of the punitive damages
award would be required.' 39 As a result, Philip Morris USA joined the
long list of cases where the Court refused to discuss due process
limitations on excessive punitive damages awards.
B.

The DissentingOpinions
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Alito joined
Justice Breyer's majority opinion. Justices Stevens, Thomas, and
Ginsburg filed separate dissenting opinions, and Justice Scalia joined
Justice Ginsburg's dissent. In his dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed
with the Court's holding that juries could not consider the harm to
nonparties when punishing the defendant's conduct. 4 ° Justice Stevens
wrote that "punitive damages are a sanction for the public harm the
defendant's conduct has caused or threatened.""' As an example,
Justice Stevens considered that a man who throws a bomb into a crowd
and kills only one person, but injures twelve, should be punished more
severely than the same man who kills that same person, but harms no
one else.'4 2 Since the first man harmed more people than the second,
a jury will demand more retribution and will require that the' first man
pay more punitive damages than the second. 43 Additionally, Justice
Stevens accused the Court of lacking judicial restraint."" He stated
that the Court must exercise the "'utmost care'" when it breaks new
ground in an area of law.145 Also, he reiterated that "the Court should
be 'reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible14 decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended.'"'

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 1067.
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
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Justice Thomas's dissent not only criticized the Court's holding, but
also reaffirmed his dissent from Campbell where he held that "'the
Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damage
awards.'"147 Considering that punitive damages were established
before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Thomas
wrote that the Due Process
Clause does not limit the jury's discretion to
1 48
award punitive damages.

The last dissent came from Justice Ginsburg who was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the Oregon Supreme Court had already done exactly what the
Court was now telling them to do.' 49 Justice Ginsburg noted that both
the Oregon Supreme Court and the majority held that a jury could
consider injuries to nonparties only when assessing the reprehensibility
of Philip Morris's actions."5 Because the majority failed to identify
any portion of the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion that contradicted the
majority's opinion, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the decision should
not have been vacated.' 5 ' In response to Justice Ginsburg's dissent,
the majority acknowledged that "one might read some portions of the
Oregon Supreme Court's opinion as focusing only upon reprehensibility."52 However, the majority concluded that the opinion as a whole
made clear that the Oregon Supreme Court was also allowing juries to
consider a nonparty's injuries when punishing the defendant.'53
Lastly, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for "reach[ing] outside
the bounds of the case" to come to its conclusion. 4 She pointed out
that the only argument Philip Morris preserved for appeal was the trial
judge's refusal to accept its jury instruction. 55 According to Justice
Ginsburg, the majority never addressed the propriety of the instruction.'5 6 After reviewing it herself, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the

147. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).

148. Id. at 1067-68 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
149. Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. Id. Compare Williams, 127 P.3d at 1177 ("[Als we have explained, the jury, in
assessing the reprehensibility of Philip Morris's actions, could consider evidence of similar
harm to other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the same conduct." (emphasis added)),
with Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct at 1064 ("[A] plaintiff may show harm to others in order

to demonstrate reprehensibility."(emphasis added)).
151. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1064 (majority opinion).

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

155. Id. at 1068.
156. Id. at 1069.
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jury instruction would confuse rather than enlighten a jury. 57 She
ended her dissent by stating that the majority should have given more
respect to the "proceedings and dispositions of the state courts that
sought diligently to adhere to our changing, less than crystalline
precedent."15 8
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The opinion in Philip Morris USA v. Williams 5 9 seems to create
more confusion than clarity. First, the decision did nothing to clarify
when punitive damages awards are excessive. Because the Court did not
address the use of a bright-line ratio, Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice
Alito's individual opinions on the subject are still unknown. If the other
members of the majority in Philip Morris USA try to create a bright-line
ratio in future cases, these two Justices may join Justices Scalia and
Thomas and refuse to create such a ratio. 60 It is also interesting to
note that Justice Stevens, who authored the opinion in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore'6 ' and was in the majority in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,16 ' dissented in Philip Morris
USA. The implications of his dissent are not great. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens reaffirmed his support for Gore and Campbell, but he
disagreed with the majority on the role that injuries to nonparties
63
should play in determining the size of punitive damages awards.'
While Justices Scalia and Thomas reaffirmed their dissents from Gore
and Campbell, Justice Scalia did not use his typical arguments against
the Court's new rule. Justice Thomas was the only Justice to reaffirm
his view that the Due Process Clause does not limit the size of punitive
damages awards. In the past, Justice Scalia has previously refused to
give stare decisis effect to Gore, and he has written that the Constitution
does not protect defendants from excessive punitive damages."6 Even

157.

Id.

158. Id.
159. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
160. Marcia Coyle, PrevailingWinds: In the FirstFull Term with Alito, Court Took
Marked Conservative Turn,NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 2007, available in Westlaw, 8/1/2007 Nat'l
L.J. 1.
161. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
162. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
163. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I remain firmly
convinced that the cases announcing those constraints were correctly decided.").
164. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
provides no substantive protections against 'excessive' or 'unreasonable' awards of punitive
damages.... I do not feel justified in giving [Gore] staredecisis effect." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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though these views mirror the arguments made in Justice Thomas's
dissent in Philip Morris USA, Justice Scalia did not sign onto Justice
Thomas's dissent. Instead he joined Justice Ginsburg who did not even
address whether the Constitution limits the jury's discretion to award
punitive damages. Justice Scalia's shift from Justice Thomas's to Justice
Ginsburg's dissent might suggest that he is backing down from his
previous dissents in Gore and Campbell, and that he may accept some
limitations on punitive damages in future cases." 5
One legal implication of Philip Morris USA is that juries now have one
more constraint placed upon them when considering punitive damages.
However, the new limitation on when a jury can consider injuries to
nonparties may not be much of a limitation because the ruling will be
166
difficult to enforce and will likely create confusion among courts.
While lawyers and judges may understand the subtle difference between
considering a nonparty's injuries when determining reprehensibility and
punishing the defendant, a jury of laymen might not. As the Court held,
it is up to the state courts to figure out how to make the distinction
clear.6 7 This mandate will require states to craft rules concerning
when to exclude evidence of injuries to nonparties. If the evidence of
injuries to nonparties would go toward reprehensibility, the states will
have to craft cautionary jury instructions to limit how the jury uses this
evidence. 6 ' Also, while the Court charged states to create protections
for defendants, the Court may have placed the burden on defendants to
request those protections." 9 When punitive damages are awarded,
defendants must be sure to request due process protections through jury
instructions and special verdict forms, and defendants must also
preserve error if those requests are denied.' ° In the end, this case
creates more questions than answers, and the confusion will probably
result in the Court having to decide another punitive damages case in
the next couple of terms.
STEVEN MOULDS
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